Waiving
Goodbye To Your Best Issues On
Appeal
By
Howard J. Bashman
Monday, June 14, 2004
What
issues can a losing party raise
on appeal? With very few exceptions,
only those issues that the losing
party has properly preserved while
the case was pending before the
trial court. This so-called "raise-or-waive"
rule is a central precept of appellate
litigation in the United States.
As Judge Bruce M. Selya explained
in a precedential opinion that
he recently issued on behalf of
a unanimous three-judge panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, "We have made
it transparently clear that the
raise-or-waive rule can neither
be ignored nor brushed aside as
'a pettifogging technicality or
a trap for the indolent.'"
But what does it mean for an issue
to be "properly preserved" in
the trial court? For one thing,
the issue needs to be presented
to the trial court for consideration.
For another thing, the issue needs
to be raised at the appropriate
time or times in the trial court.
Assume, for example, that for
a plaintiff to recover damages
in a suit against a defendant
the jury needs to rule in the
plaintiff's favor on three separate
elements of the cause of action.
Assume further that the jury charge
erroneously fails to instruct
the jury to consider and return
a finding on one of those three
elements.
If the improperly instructed jury
returns an award in favor of the
plaintiff, in order to prevail
on appeal the defendant will need
to establish not only that it
advised the trial court at some
unspecified time in the proceedings
that plaintiff's claim consisted
of three separate elements, but
also that the defendant objected
to the erroneous jury charge when
the charge was given to the jury.
The "raise-or-waive" rule serves
the important goals of fairness
and judicial economy. Giving a
trial court the opportunity to
correct an error will avoid appellate
proceedings if the trial court
takes advantage of that opportunity
for correction. And even if the
trial court does not take advantage
of the opportunity, at least the
trial court is likely to give
its reasons for rejecting the
losing party's claim of error.
An appellate court almost always
benefits from having an explanation
of why the trial court ruled as
it did.
Also, allowing new issues to be
raised on appeal without regard
to whether the issues had been
presented to the trial court would
invariably increase the number
of issues that appellate courts
are asked to resolve. Although
plenty of lawyers correctly realize
that the likelihood of success
on appeal is inversely proportionate
to the number of issues being
raised on appeal, the temptation
to summon forth new issues to
accompany those rejected in the
trial court would be too strong
for many lawyers to resist.
As commonly understood and applied,
the raise-or-waive rule is fair
both to the parties and the trial
court. Finding an issue waived
on appeal is, however, a harsh
remedy, and therefore appellate
courts should resist the temptation
to expand the rules that allow
for a finding of waiver beyond
their usual boundaries. In particular,
the state appellate courts of
Pennsylvania have begun to find
issues waived on appeal under
circumstances where neither logic
nor justice would seem to require
such a result.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(b) provides that
after a party files a notice of
appeal, the trial court "may enter
an order directing the appellant
to file of record in the lower
court and serve on the trial judge
a concise statement of the matters
complained of on the appeal....
A failure to comply with such
direction may be considered by
the appellate court as a waiver
of all objections to the order,
ruling or other matter complained
of."
Rule 1925(b) has a laudable purpose:
the rule allows the trial court
to determine whether a sufficient
explanation of the reasons for
the ruling or rulings to be challenged
on appeal already exists in the
record. If the trial court concludes
that additional explanation is
merited, the trial court can issue
a new opinion in support of the
ruling(s) being challenged on
appeal.
As written, Rule 1925(b) is unobjectionable.
Unfortunately, judicial decisions
finding waiver under Rule 1925(b)
apply that rule of procedure far
more broadly than its plain language
dictates. Perhaps the most significant
departure from Rule 1925(b)'s
plain language came in the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania's ruling
in Commonwealth v. Lord
(1998). There, Pennsylvania's
highest court held, notwithstanding
Rule 1925(b)'s plain language
that an appellate court "may"
find waiver if the rule's requirements
are not complied with, that a
failure to comply with Rule 1925(b)
mandates a finding of waiver.
In the aftermath of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania's ruling
in Lord, a number of
cases reached Pennsylvania's intermediate
appellate courts in which the
appellant failed to file a Rule
1925(b) statement of matters complained
of on appeal even though the trial
courts had requested one, but
the trial courts nevertheless
issued a supplemental opinion
addressing the issue or issues
that the trial courts anticipated
were going to be the subject of
the appeal. In some of those cases,
the trial courts guessed correctly,
issuing opinions that addressed
the very issues that the appellants
later sought to raise on appeal.
Despite the existence of a post-appeal
opinion which addressed the very
issue that the appealing party
thereafter sought to raise before
the appellate court, the appellate
court nevertheless ruled that
the appealing party's failure
to file a Rule 1925(b) statement
of matters to be raised on appeal
waived the appellant's ability
to raise even those issues that
the trial court adequately addressed
in its post-appeal opinion. The
reason provided in such cases
(see, for example, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania's ruling
in Commonwealth v. Lemon
(2002)) is that the appealing
party is harmed if the trial court
instead formulates the issue to
be raised on appeal.
I find that claim of "harm" singularly
unpersuasive. Does a party sustain
greater harm if the issue it wishes
to pursue on appeal is deemed
waived or if the issue is deemed
preserved for appellate consideration
because the trial court fortuitously
anticipated the issue in drafting
its post-appeal opinion? The "harm"
that the Superior Court hypothesizes
-- forcing a party to be stuck
with the issues that the trial
court anticipates in its post-trial
opinion -- pales in comparison
to the harm that the Superior
Court's own ruling visits on the
appealing party, which is a waiver
of all issues that could be raised
on appeal.
It is important to note that a
trial court would be well within
its discretion, where an appellant
failed to provide the requested
Rule 1925(b) statement of matters
complained of on appeal, to simply
issue a perfunctory order recommending
that all issues be deemed waived
on appeal. But where a trial court,
in the absence of a party's Rule
1925(b) statement, nevertheless
issues an opinion addressing issues
that the appealing party thereafter
seeks to press on appeal, it makes
no sense for the appellate court
to hold that the issues which
the trial court addressed are
waived. Rule 1925(b)'s purpose
has been satisfied, and the appellate
court has the benefit of the trial
court's reasoning.
Pennsylvania appellate courts
are also applying Rule 1925(b)
too broadly in another significant
respect. Instead of treating Rule
1925(b) waiver as an issue that
the appellate courts will address
if the parties on appeal raise
the issue in their briefs, Pennsylvania
appellate courts are now independently
finding issues waived under Rule
1925(b) even where the parties
have neither addressed the point
in their briefs nor at oral argument.
Some issues, such as a court's
subject matter or appellate jurisdiction,
are deemed so important that an
appellate court properly may address
them in the absence of argument
from the parties. Even in those
instances, however, an appellate
court usually will seek the parties'
views on whether jurisdiction
exists before ruling that it does
not exist. But the question whether
an issue on appeal has been properly
preserved in a party's Rule 1925(b)
statement is not the equivalent
of determining whether an appellate
court or trial court has jurisdiction
over a case.
Nevertheless, in recent months
I have seen the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania hold, in a case
in which the parties in their
briefs and at oral argument did
nothing other than discuss the
merits of the issues on appeal,
that the appealing party's Rule
1925(b) statement failed to state
with adequate specificity the
question raised on appeal, and
therefore the question was waived.
In these circumstances, federal
appellate courts would typically
hold that the party that prevailed
in the trial court has waived
the issue of the appellant's waiver
by failing to raise waiver as
an argument in support of affirmance
of the judgment on appeal. (To
find a sampling of such cases,
simply search for the phrase "waived
waiver" on Westlaw in the Seventh
Circuit database.)
Assuredly, the whopping caseload
that Pennsylvania's intermediate
appellate courts face makes it
quite tempting for those courts
to seek out on their own any opportunity
to avoid addressing on the merits
arguments that parties raise on
appeal. Yet the issue of Rule
1925(b) waiver should only be
considered if raised by a party
on appeal. To begin with, that
is how the adversarial system
of justice is intended to work.
And any other approach would be
unfair to the appealing party,
which never had an opportunity
to address Rule 1925(b) waiver
before receiving an appellate
court's decision holding that
such waiver precludes consideration
of the merits on appeal.
For these reasons, Pennsylvania's
appellate courts should allow
parties to pursue on appeal those
issues that a trial court's post-appeal
opinion adequately addresses,
even in the absence of a Rule
1925(b) statement, and Pennsylvania's
appellate courts should not find
waiver under Rule 1925(b) in the
absence of an argument from the
party opposing the appeal that
such a waiver has occurred.
This article
is reprinted with permission from
the June 14, 2004, issue of The
Legal Intelligencer © 2004 NLP
IP Company.
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