This month, two
judges who have served together
as colleagues on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
for more than twenty-five years
are to be married. When Fifth
Circuit Chief Judge Carolyn
Dineen King marries Senior Fifth
Circuit Judge Thomas M. Reavley,
they will become the first married
couple ever to serve together
on a federal appellate court.
At a time when
acrimony between judicial colleagues
receives far more attention
than judges who are able to
work cooperatively and develop
affection for one another, it
is refreshing to see that love
can be found and can flourish
behind the large velvet curtain
that divides the public portion
of a courtroom from the part
that is open only to judges
and their employees.
While I have nothing
but good wishes to extend to
this about-to-be-married couple,
the question arises whether
a husband and wife who work
as judges on the same federal
appellate court should be permitted
to serve together on the same
three-judge panel or en banc
court. This question appears
to have no easy answer.
By tradition,
judges who serve on appellate
courts recuse when they are
confronted with an appeal from
a ruling issued by a trial judge
who is a close family member.
Accordingly, U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Stephen G. Breyer appears
to recuse from participating
in any review of cases on which
his brother, U.S. District Judge
Charles R. Breyer of the Northern
District of California, has
ruled. Fourth Circuit Judge
Diana Gribbon Motz appears to
recuse from reviewing cases
that have been pending before
her husband, U.S. District Judge
J. Frederick Motz of the District
of Maryland. And the Fifth Circuit
in October 2003 held that a
federal district judge should
have recused from ruling on
a case in which the magistrate
judge who issued a report and
recommendation was the district
judge’s spouse.
But while it seems
clearly established that spouses
and brothers should not review
one another's rulings where
they serve at different levels
of the hierarchical federal
court structure, it is less
clear whether spouses or brothers
should refrain from serving
together on the same appellate
court panels.
The U.S. Congress
in 1998 passed a law providing
that "No person may be
appointed to the position of
judge of a court exercising
judicial power under article
III of the United States Constitution
(other than the Supreme Court)
who is related by affinity or
consanguinity within the degree
of first cousin to any judge
who is a member of the same
court." While it may be
disputed whether Congress has
the authority to limit in this
matter how the President of
the United States exercises
the power to appoint Article
III judges, certainly the U.S.
Senate can refuse to confirm
for a lifetime appointment any
nominees who run afoul of the
statute.
Yet for the past
twelve years, two brothers --
Richard S. Arnold and Morris
S. Arnold -- have served together
on the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, and
they have sat on the same three-judge
panels many times and have heard
cases together when that court
has sat en banc.
Some accused President
Bill Clinton of taking the lyrics
to Paul Simon's song "Mother
and Child Reunion" too
literally when he nominated
William A. Fletcher to join
the Ninth Circuit, where his
mother Betty Binns Fletcher
was already serving as a judge.
Republicans in the U.S. Senate
refused to confirm the son unless
the mother promised to take
senior status, which she did.
The two Fletchers do not appear
to have heard any cases together
during the son’s nearly
six years of service on that
court.
Although it is
impossible to predict whether
the Fifth Circuit's newly married
couple will continue to hear
and decide cases by serving
together on the same three-judge
panels, they have continued
to hear cases together after
they became engaged to be married.
Indeed, in July 2004 those two
judges found themselves in disagreement
over a case involving whether
an inmate assigned to sleep
in a constantly illuminated
prison cell stated a valid claim
for cruel and unusual punishment
due to the sleep deprivation
the lighting caused. At least
their majority and dissenting
opinions did not exchange any
barbs over whether loud snoring
in the bedroom can also constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.
Section 455 of
Title 28 of the United States
Code requires a federal judge
to recuse from matters in which
"He or his spouse, or a
person within the third degree
of relationship to either of
them, or the spouse of such
a person" is either a party,
"acting as a lawyer in
the proceeding," or "[i]s
known by the judge to have an
interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the
proceeding."
Presumably the
rationale is that where a close
family member is acting as an
attorney in the proceeding,
a judge might be tempted to
rule on an improper basis because
a family member's record of
success in court may help or
hinder that attorney's career.
It is far less
clear why closely-related federal
judges who serve at different
levels of the judiciary should
not review one another's rulings.
For example, District Judge
Charles R. Breyer will not be
assigned a better quality of
cases if the U.S. Supreme Court,
on which his brother serves,
constantly sides with his rulings.
District Judge Motz would continue
to be assigned the same sort
of cases, and be paid the same
salary, even if the Fourth Circuit,
on which his wife serves, were
never to reverse another of
his rulings. Nor will the magistrate
judge based in Texas be assigned
better cases because his or
her spouse, serving as a federal
district court judge, constantly
accepts the magistrate judge's
reports and recommendations
instead of rejecting them.
Thus, the rationale
behind the unwritten policy
that closely-related federal
judges serving at different
levels of the judiciary should
not review one another's rulings
must be based instead on a concern
that they would favor upholding
their relative's rulings not
to advance the relative's career,
but simply because they were
members of the same family.
Regardless of whether this concern
has merit, the question arises
whether a similar sort of concern
applies to related judges serving
together on the same appellate
court.
The current practice,
in which closely-related federal
judges are free to serve together
on appellate panels but are
prohibited from reviewing each
other's decisions at different
levels of the judicial hierarchy,
does not appear to me to be
based on any sensible distinction.
In fact, the current approach
seems to be based on a belief
that closely-related judges
serving together on the same
court are more likely to feel
free to disagree with one another's
view of a single case than closely-related
judges serving on different
levels of the judiciary.
That belief, however,
is not persuasive. A single
appellate judge's view of a
case will lack the force of
law unless he or she can attract
enough support from other judges
hearing the case to constitute
a majority. The process of deciding
cases on appeal does not always
consist of a dispassionate,
simultaneous exchange of views
between appellate judges. Rather,
often it consists of lobbying
between judges in an effort
to convince colleagues that
one proposed disposition of
the case is preferable to another.
If a judge should not be deciding
whether to affirm a ruling of
a closely-related family member,
why should another judge be
permitted to decide whether
the position favored by a closely-related
family member serving on the
same court will garner majority
support?
I do not find
the tradition that prohibits
closely-related family members
from ruling on the same case
at different levels of the hierarchical
federal judicial system to be
particularly persuasive, but
that tradition seems well-entrenched
and thus unlikely to change.
If that tradition is worth upholding,
then it would seem to follow
that closely-related judges
should not sit together to decide
the same cases on appeal.
This article
is reprinted with permission
from the August 9, 2004, issue
of The Legal Intelligencer ©
2004 NLP IP Company.