Federal appellate
courts violate the United States
Constitution when they deny
precedential effect to their
unpublished opinions. The United
States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, based in
St. Louis, Missouri, reached
this unanticipated conclusion
on August 22, 2000 when it issued
its ruling in Anastasoff
v. United States, 223
F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000). The
ruling portends significant
consequences that require the
immediate attention of the Philadelphia-based
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. The Third
Circuit currently uses unpublished
opinions -- decisions issued
to the parties' attorneys and
the trial judge that never appear
in the court's official case
law reporter -- to decide more
appeals than ever.
In the Anastasoff case,
the plaintiff sued the federal
government to challenge its
refusal to refund federal income
tax that she had overpaid. The
trial court ruled in favor of
the government, and Ms. Anastasoff
then appealed to the Eighth
Circuit. In its brief on appeal,
the government noted that the
Eighth Circuit had rejected
in an earlier unpublished opinion
the precise argument that Ms.
Anastasoff was raising. In her
reply brief, Ms. Anastasoff
contended that the appellate
court's earlier unpublished
ruling was irrelevant for two
reasons. First, she observed
that the Eighth Circuit's own
rules declare that unpublished
opinions lack precedential value,
requiring the three-judge panel
deciding her appeal to disregard
the unpublished decision. Second,
she argued that the result the
unpublished opinion reached
was wrong and, therefore, the
opposite result should be reached
in her case.
Ms. Anastasoff's appeal thus
squarely presented the question
whether federal appellate courts
may, in the words of the Eighth
Circuit, "choose for themselves,
from among all the cases they
decide, those that they will
follow in the future, and those
that they need not." The Eighth
Circuit reasoned that if it
upheld its rule denying precedential
effect to unpublished opinions,
it would be declaring: "We may
have decided this question the
opposite way yesterday, but
this does not bind us today,
and, what's more, you cannot
even tell us what we did yesterday."
After conducting a detailed
historical examination of the
U.S. Constitution and of the
judicial function both at common
law and at the time of the Constitution's
framing, the Eighth Circuit
ruled unanimously that the Constitution
prohibits federal appellate
courts from issuing non-precedential
opinions. The Eighth Circuit
thus renounced its prior creation
of "an underground body of law
good for one place and time
only" and held that its earlier
unpublished decision rejecting
the very same argument that
Ms. Anastasoff was raising required
a ruling in the government's
favor. To remove any ambiguity
about the breadth of its holding,
the Eighth Circuit also declared
unconstitutional the provision
in its Local Rules of Appellate
Procedure stating that unpublished
opinions are non-precedential.
Circuit Judge Richard S. Arnold,
who wrote the Eighth Circuit's
opinion in Anastasoff,
has in that decision presented
an impeccably reasoned explanation
of why the U.S. Constitution
prohibits federal appellate
courts from denying precedential
effect to their opinions. If
you doubt the soundness of that
ruling, which admittedly came
as quite a surprise to many
appellate judges and practitioners,
those doubts will disappear
once you review the opinion,
which may be accessed online,
free of charge, at the Eighth
Circuit's Web site (http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/).
The Third Circuit has yet to
react noticeably to the Eighth
Circuit's ruling in Anastasoff.
Like the Eighth Circuit, the
Third Circuit has its own rule
that purports to deny precedential
effect to its unpublished opinions.
To complicate matters further,
the Third Circuit now issues
a greater number of unpublished
(and therefore supposedly non-precedential)
opinions than at any time in
its history. Next month's column
will address the reasons for,
and the consequences and desirability
of, the Third Circuit's recent
proliferation of unpublished
opinions. For present purposes,
however, it is sufficient to
observe that the Third Circuit
today is regularly engaging
in the constitutional violation
that Anastasoff identifies.
Finally, and perhaps most distressingly,
the Third Circuit is one of
only a few federal appellate
courts that refuses to post
its unpublished opinions on
its Web site (http://pacer.ca3.uscourts.gov/)
and refuses to permit its unpublished
opinions to appear on Westlaw
or Lexis.
Even if all agree with the validity
of the Eighth Circuit's ruling
in Anastasoff, the
decision's consequences are
unlikely to be warmly received
by federal appellate judges.
Federal appellate courts did
not adopt local rules denying
precedential effect to unpublished
opinions to retain the unfettered,
and arguably unlawful, discretion
to decide a question one way
today and then precisely the
opposite way tomorrow in a different
case. Indeed, the Third Circuit's
internal rules recommend that
opinions should only be designated
as unpublished if they appear
to lack precedential value and
are likely to be of consequence
only to the parties and the
trial judge. Unpublished opinions
also take less time to prepare
and, in most instances, receive
less-intensive review from the
non-authoring judges on the
panel. And, whereas the Third
Circuit will not issue a for-publication
panel opinion until after every
active judge on the court has
the opportunity to review and
comment on the proposed decision,
unpublished opinions can often
be issued after having been
reviewed only by the other two
judges on the panel.
In the more than eleven years
that I have been involved in
working on appeals, the first
two years of which were spent
clerking for a Third Circuit
judge, I have observed no instance
in which any federal appellate
court has issued an unpublished
opinion because the parties
in a given appeal deserved to
be treated differently than
would parties in a hypothetical,
later appeal presenting exactly
the same facts and issues. Many
appeals that the Third Circuit
decides either make no new law
or involve questions of state
law as to which a state's supreme
court is the definitive arbiter.
Yet, notwithstanding how very
smart they are, federal appellate
judges would need to be clairvoyant
to anticipate accurately whether
today's seemingly unique or
unimportant decision will provide
decisive precedent for an appeal
arising months or years from
now.
The Anastasoff decision
recognizes the practical concerns
at stake: "It is often said
among judges that the volume
of appeals is so high that it
is simply unrealistic to ascribe
precedential value to every
decision. We do not have enough
time to do a decent enough job,
the argument runs, when put
in plain language, to justify
treating every opinion as a
precedent." The opinion concludes
that these concerns are insufficient
to allow federal appellate courts
to engage in the unconstitutional
practice of denying precedential
effect to unpublished opinions.
Instead, according to the Eighth
Circuit, the remedy "is to create
enough judgeships to handle
the volume, or, if that is not
practical, for each judge to
take enough time to do a competent
job with each case. If this
means that backlogs will grow,
the price must still be paid."
To address this problem here
at home, the Third Circuit should
take the immediate step of providing
all newly-released unpublished
opinions to Westlaw and Lexis
and, as soon as practicable,
should begin issuing newly released
unpublished opinions on its
Web site. For all the many reasons
explained in Anastasoff,
the Third Circuit should also
rescind its rule that purports
to deny precedential effect
to its unpublished opinions.
The many thousands of unpublished
opinions that the Third Circuit
has previously issued may give
rise to a logistical nightmare,
for they too must be recognized
as having precedential value,
if they have not been overruled
by the U.S. Supreme Court or
by the Third Circuit sitting
en banc or rendered irrelevant
by more recent legislative or
state law developments. Today
this vast body of unpublished
Third Circuit law is all but
inaccessible to litigants, lawyers
and trial judges. If at all
possible, the Third Circuit
through its Clerk's Office should
compile all prior unpublished
opinions and release them to
Westlaw, Lexis and any other
publisher, person or entity
willing to purchase them.
Until these steps occur in the
Third Circuit and in other federal
appellate courts, Anastasoff
provides a compelling basis
for lawyers to cite and rely
on unpublished federal appellate
opinions as controlling precedent
when arguing their cases in
federal court, notwithstanding
local rules to the contrary.
In Anastasoff's aftermath,
federal appellate courts will
retain the discretion to decide
which opinions are important
enough that they should be officially
published, but they will no
longer have the ability to issue
rulings that purport to bind
only the parties to a particular
appeal but not the court or
litigants in future cases.
This article is reprinted with
permission from the December
11, 2000 issue of The Legal
Intelligencer © 2000 NLP IP
Company.